UK Identity Cards and Civil Liberties

UK indistinguishability Cards and elegant LibertiesThe entre of individuality card game in the UK infringes upon our homophile reclaims and urbane liberties whilst genuinely doing very little to anticipate abomination and act of terrorism Discuss limit AbstractIntroductionChapter One Surveillance as a kernel of offence dis whollyowion replication terrorism1.1 Is watch needed for shame pr chargetion?1.2 Is command needed for snack bar terrorism?Chapter Two change magnitude surveillance the viability of selective training guardianship2.1 entropy remembering and individuality separate2.2 Is selective randomness property a positive thing?2.3 The stretch of information retentivity pattern of right-hand(a)sChapter Three Has the intromission of the identity cards intention armed serviced to split psyche human rights and civil liberties regarding secretiveness in the akin appearance as other forms of surveillance?3.1 The right to personal loneliness3.2 atomic emergence 18 human rights and civil liberties efficaciously prize domestic whatsoever last(predicate)y?3.3 How far is the right to personal privacy recognised in law?3.4 How does the ICA 2006 fit into sagaciousness human rights and civil liberties?ConclusionBibliographyThe aim of this study is to consider whether the initiation of identity cards in the UK would indeed infringe upon our human rights and civil liberties, whilst as well as prospecting to determine whether it would actually be an takeive r fall oute of combating crime and terrorism. Therefore, this paper forget look to consider the enactment of the Identity Cards Act (ICA) 2006 and the problems that atomic number 18 uniformly to arise from the introduction of the proposed lineation. Then, it impart also be essential to consider the background to the enactment of the ICA 2006 by putting this development into context with a consideration of Closed term of enlistment Television (CC TV) and the development of info retentivity surveillance techniques apply to store up randomness about batch with the aim to prevent crime and counter terrorism.However, this paper will also look to recognise the legal abstract thought employ to bonnyify this conformation of surveillance and information gathering that, although inverse to the recognition of the human rights and civil liberties of some angiotensin converting enzymes, is considered necessary to guard the interest of connection as a whole against the threat of terrorism and real crime. But, at the equivalent time, this paper will also recognise this kind of surveillance whitethorn actually be doing very little to counter terrorism and serious crime and is not only br to each oneing concourses recognised human rights and civil liberties, but also felonizing the population and breaking the law in the process. Then, finally, in summation it will be necessary to look to conclude with a balanced and logical over ascertain of this discussion legally derived from an rationality of the issues covered to personate a reasoned expression regarding this issue.At the revoke of 2006, principle was passed domestically in this country in relation to the introduction of identity cards end-to-end the UK in the form of the ICA 2006 as a means of crime saloon and counter terrorism. But, interestingly, in spite of its simply noble intentions, the ICA 2006 is seen by many as only enabling legislation that merely caters the legal modeling about which the scheme of identity cards is to be developed and it does not purport to provide details of any aspect of the schemes overall operation1. This is beca phthisis the Act itself proposed the use of biometric identity cards2 to establish and fight down a entropybase of information called the issue Identity Register (NIR) on all individuals surely residing within the UK in support of ongoing efforts to help prevent terrorism or serious crim es from occurring3 by allowing for an easy means to reckon and prove an individuals identity4. Therefore, the enactment of this legislation meant both mystical and personal companies could regain this register to confirm an individuals identity or simply check the accuracy of their information.However, this constitution is not without its problems. This is because whilst sectionalisations 19 and 23 of the ICA 2006 only permit overture to recruits without consent if it is in the interests of content shelter or for thinks connected with the barroom or detection of crime, the legislation allows for information to be added without the individuals knowledge with the aim of eventually having fifty pieces of an individuals personal information on their card that would then be stored on the aforementioned selective informationbase with the NIR5. But despite the item many critics press the NIR will allow the government to monitor and record al nearly every aspect of a persons b read and butter, al closely all of the information listed in Schedule 1 of the ICA 2006 as macrocosm required that includes sig spirit, buck from a passport, name and address (both current and previous), date of birth and discipline insurance number for this purpose is already in the governments possession and everyone has the right to see what information is held about them.Nevertheless, on that point is a solicitude that hackers are bound to attempt to gain access to the NIR database in the homogeneous way as in the US, in April 2005, when it was reported reed Elsevier may have accidentally released the personal information of 310,000 US citizens during 59 separate criminal incidents6. It is perhaps little wonder then that the scheme to be developed nether the ICA 2006 has led to a great care for of criticism from various organisations. Economists, in item, have argued that such a scheme would be excessively expensive for what they believe to be fair express mail resul ts in fool of the fact that whilst government estimates have put the make up of the schemes introduction alone at about 6 billion pounds7, a group of analysts at the London School of economics consider the figure to be closer to 18 billion that must(prenominal) ultimately diminish out of the publics pocket through taxation8.Therefore, whilst the use of identity cards brought about by the enactment of the ICA 2006 could be considered the latest advancement of surveillance technology with the consistent aim of preventing crime and counter terrorism, oppugn marks remain over whether this kind of policy is an acceptable tool in view of the need to recognise individual human rights and civil liberties9. But this is not the first time that the legitimacy of surveillance has been called into question, despite its aims to prevent crime and counter terrorism, so it is necessary to look to consider whether the use of this kind of surveillance technology has achieved anything in this regard.Every man should know that his conversations, his correspondence, and his personal life, are indeed confidential. Lyndon B Johnson 1908-1973 President of the United States of AmericaIn spite of Lyndon B. Johnsons view ostensibly in support of Mill10, the use of surveillance techniques has become more and more widespread with the passing of time because technology in this area has march on at such a pace that even the public at large is becoming ever more aware that surveillance no longer simply refers to the work of spies in Ian Fleming novels. The word itself in cut literally means watching over11 and, in this context, refers to all forms of reflexion or observe of some other for public or common soldier purposes. Now, however, most concourse are aware such techniques are utilize by law enforcement agencies, business and even reclusive individual so as to gain useful information in relation to the activities of suspected criminals and terrorists where a threat i s perceived leading to an eventual arrest where it is warranted12. In particular they are usually most commonly aware of the use of CCTV cameras on buildings and in shops. But the use of identity cards is just another means of surveillance as its production and use will efficaciously act like a form of tracking whereby the government activity and personal and public organisations will gain yet another insight into the clannish lives of individuals by creating a verifiable document trail that the authorities foundation follow.1.1 Is surveillance needed for crime prevention?The UK leads the world in the minginess of public surveillance devices to people13. This is because, about ten years ago, the UK government used 150 million each year to develop a grummet Television (CCTV) network well-nigh the country14 so that the industry grew exponentially throughout the 1990s so, by 2003, at least two and a fractional million cameras could be found in this country15 that continues to i ncrease at around 20% per year16. The net effect is substantial. It is widely believed everyone in London is caught on camera at least three hundred times each day17 and very often these cameras do not just watch and record us, but also use facial recognition software to see subjects against a criminal database18.Although statistical show up is fairly limited in relation to the effectiveness of surveillance technology in view of the fact there is usually practically more to crime prevention and counter terrorism19, the authorities downplay this negative element and emphasise the positive where a protection issue of national significance is re resolved. Such a view is effectively illustrated by the fact whilst the police review of CCTV tapes played a meaningful role in identifying a suspected terrorist handler knotted in the bombing of Kings Cross in July 200520, there remains a overabundant view that, if anything, crime levels have stayed the same or even increased despite th e widespread installation of CCTV cameras.National statistics have shown that, whilst around three quarters of the Home Office crime Prevention budget has generally spent on CCTV, a panoptic review has revealed the overall reduction in crime was only around 5% by 200221 and has continued to make small incremental reductions across the country ever since22. But as a stark mark of the achievement of CCTV in preventing crime, a parallel arrangementatic review found that avenue lighting saw a reduction in crime of 20%, whilst CCTV cameras usefulness is then further marked against because it is lowstood that only around 3% of all street robberies in London are solved using CCTV footage23.Interestingly, however, in Portsmouth the City Council released crime statistics for the first three months of 2008 that showed that of 1384 save incidents this led to 346 arrests that were recorded by the network of 172 CCTV cameras in Portsmouth and marked this out as mark of their usefulness as crime solving tool24, whilst, in Newham, police claimed an 11% scratch off in assaults, a 49% drop in burglary, and a 44% drop in criminal damage25 where cameras were installed26. However, as well as possibly being merely an aberration in our understanding of the overall usefulness of CCTV cameras and surveillance technology as a whole, the source of the statistics is a branch of government. Therefore, unfortunately, this may mean the results have been embellished to present CCTV as being a good use of public bills and, even where this is not the representative, the police may have made the same number of arrests anyway so that it is fairly surprising that the cameras have such support to enforce the law27.1.2 Is surveillance needed for counter terrorism?However, since the tragical events of 9/11 in the US, such action is also justify because it is arguable this led to the establishment of a renewed approach to surveillance in the interests of national and international securi ty across the world. Therefore, 9/11 effectively served to reveal terrorist groups had organised themselves transnationally making it stiffer to trace them using traditionalistic surveillance techniques28. As a result, whereas in the past, terrorist groups could be readily reason by reference to territory, this is no longer the case because, organised on a global scale, these loosely affiliated cells can operate simultaneously in various States. This is because they are not unified by a single vertical command but horizontally29 by using modern font communication and transportation technology, whilst the integration of financial markets also facilitates their mobility and range of targets without claiming a particular territory as home30.On this basis, globally, countries realised they had a shared interest in enhancing international co-operation to fight terrorism because of the fear groups may be in possession of non-conventional weapons such as biological, chemic and nuclea r31. Therefore, the international community must work unitedly because such a threat cannot be vanquished by single States alone32, as the UN recognises certain States being otiose or unwilling to prevent or stop the profession of such weapons means the ability of non-State actors to traffic in nuclear strong and technology is aided by ineffective State control of b effectuates and travel through weak States33. Clearly, the international community must hold together to find effective solutions because, although 9/11 undoubtedly showed the world that even the leading democracy was not safe from terrorist attacks.Whereas in the past a series of diplomatic, economic and financial measures nationally to fight terrorist structures34, to multiply the effect of such measures, States agreed to co-operate internationally by using treaty law with around a dozen multilateral conventions on anti- and counter-terrorism35. Therefore, in theory, no terrorist activity would go unpunished36. Bu t the UN has struggled since its inception to formulate an effective response. On the one hand, it has provided a solid international legal framework for combating terrorism via the adoption of terrorism- resuscitated treaties by the General Assembly and UN agencies. But, on the other hand, the UN has been unable to reach agreement on a definition of terrorism that outlaws all indiscriminate attacks against civilians and circumvents the need to recognise the human rights and civil liberties of the public at large, so more than twenty different parts of the UN system administer with terrorism in one form or another37.However, in europium it was not until the 2004 train bombings in Madrid that the EU looked to take significant action to counter terrorism and prevent serious crime. This is because those investigating the attacks in Madrid discovered tele communication theory played a significant role in planning of the attacks because they were co-ordinated by mobile phone and via th e Internet. Unfortunately, however, at the time of the attacks the Spanish authorities had only limited access to help to telecommunications networks in entrap to further their investigations when more traditional methods of surveillance associated with the aforementioned use of CCTV were somewhat lacking38. This is because with the advancement of technology in this area, traditional surveillance has been made somewhat redundant by the use of Internet so that, in order to be able to effectively prevent serious crime and counter terrorism in the modern age, there is a need to expend data retentiveness technology.Chapter Two Increased surveillance the viability of data retention2.1 information retention and identity cardsOn this basis, the original plea for the ICA 2006 identity cards scheme was the supposed need to combat the serious problems of illegal working and identity fraud. This is because the government estimated identity fraud amounted to a 1.3 billion annual loss to the UK economy39, and the governments first credit paper in this area specifically eschewed many of the claims for identity cards that some other advocates suggest they would bring such as combating terrorism, make fraud and crime more generally40. However, the draft legislation clearly presented the identity card as a device with which to combat terrorism, whilst the 2003 governments white paper41 emphasised the use of identity cards as an effective tool. According to Privacy International, government ministers in the UK have argued in place interviews that, although the 2001 New York and 2004 Madrid42 atrocities had been committed by people with valid US documents and Spanish identity cards respectively, many other terrorists use false identities and they also claimed the quality of the database underpinning the British scheme would be much juicyer than the Spanish.2.2 Is data retention a positive thing?Nevertheless, aside from the more specify temperament of the identity cards scheme proposed in the UK under the ICA 2006, this kind of data retention has previously proved to be a very positive thing that has served to enhance the lives of those living within our society. As most people are aware, such technology is already being used in the form of services that text details of the closest eating place based on a mobile phone location when your hungry, or help to pick an exit at the next roundabout when you are lost can be very useful. But any retention of collected data is also very negative because the advantages of technology come at a price, since one persons enhanced information can invade anothers privacy43. This is because an individuals right privacy is becoming increasingly susceptible to the advancement of technology with the introduction of wiretaps, biometrics, and video surveillance cameras all each having the potential to erode privacy44 in the same way as identification cards, whilst digital interactive video technology may even soon tell advertisers exactly which programs people view in their homes45.Therefore, such advancements are clearly both dependable and frightening46. This is because it is commonly understood that no modern technology derived from the development of telecommunications poses a greater threat to privacy than the Internet47 by allowing researchers to collect data much more cheaply and efficiently48 because what once took a great many old age hard labour can now be accomplished with a keystroke49. But it is also important to appreciate that the skirt of the selective information store Directive50 effectively allows EU penis States to synchronise their laws so all telephone companies and ISP companies within each and every EU Member State are obliged to retain details on all electronic communications for up to two years for the purpose of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crimes51.2.3 The scope of data retention lawsThe main categories of data generated and processed to be contain under the Data holding Directive regarding communications are the retention of data to (a) trace and identify its source (e.g. caller) b) identify its destination (e.g. number dialled) (c) identify its date, time and duration (d) identify its type (i.e. network or service used) (e) identify equipment (i.e. means) (f) identify that equipments location and (g) regarding unsuccessful calls52. But this is somewhat controversial because unsuccessful calls occur where a telephone call has successfully connected, but has not been answered53. However, whilst no data regarding the content of the communications is to be retained54, EU Member States should also ensure datas security is respected as a reflection of equivalent provisions for the tribute of personal data in the Data Protection Directive55. This is because, through measures to protect data against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or unauthorised or unlawful storage, processing, acces s or disclosure56 of data is accessible by authorised personnel57.As part of this process, EU Member States must also have measures in place to ensure any criminal access to or transfer of data retained under the Data Retention Directive is punishable by effective penalties58. Therefore, the Data Retention Directive provides only data retained should be provided to the equal national authorities in specific cases59, but fails to recognise which authorities are likely to be competent and the reasons why such data may be accessed. This effectively means this could lead to uneven access to data across the EU because there is no definition of specifically authorised personnel or law enforcement authorities, but oblige 9 recognises each Member State must designate one or more public authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application of the Directive regarding security of stored data.Therefore, in the UK, the Home Office has looked to stretch out a set of draft Regulations in the form of the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations (Regulations)60 to effectively implement the Data Retention Directives nature and scope61. But the Regulations only looked to address the retention of certain call data by telephony companies because EU Member States can delay the Data Retention Directives implementation regarding traffic data for an redundant 18 months until March of 200962. Nevertheless, even before they have been implemented, the UK Regulations also nix to allay the fears raised by human rights advocates regarding the EUs Data Retention Directive because the Regulations remain as unspecific and unrestrictive as the Directive. However, domestically, the authorities have a great deal of experience with the retention of traditional communications data because they have been working with the industry to ensure the retention of this data since 2003, when Parliament first approved the code of practice for the voluntary retention of communications data under P art 11 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200163.Nevertheless, whilst the retention of data was voluntary under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, because it was made in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, its voluntary code has served as the foundation for establishing a practical framework for the enforced retention of communications data so the draft regulations provide the next step towards a mandatory framework64. Such a view was supported by the fact that the EU set a high global standard in data privacy protection when it sorry its Data Protection Directive65, which became effective in October 199866, and created such a inflexible legislative approach to privacy67. But the ATCSA 2001 was then amended so that the purpose of such retention became (a) for the purpose of safeguarding national security or (b) for the purposes of prevention or detection of crime or the prosecution of offenders which may relate directly or indirectly to nati onal security68 so the access would then be just for limited purposes.Therefore, it is important to recognise that the UKs Regulations have established provisions to continue with the policy of reimbursing public communications providers their expenditure from adjusting their business practices to comply with the Governments requirements for the retention of communications data. But the interception of communications and the obtaining and disclosure of data relating to them is currently regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 because section 21 recognises communications data does not include the contents of the communications, but that, in the interests of national security, they may still obtain it. Consequently, the Data Retention Directive will effectively serve to augment RIPA 2000 that does not currently require the specific retention of data in advance, but the police are able to serve section 22 (S22) telecommunication companies within the industry for access to the data that they retain.Accordingly, whilst the RIPA 2000 will only permit the interception of communications in the UK by specify bodies in specified circumstances to protect individuals privacy, the longer the data retention period, the greater the period of access that will provided to the authorities in the interests of security69. Nevertheless, ostensibly, it is to be appreciated that the RIPA 2000 is designed to ensure that the relevant investigatory powers are used in accordance with human rights, since it extends the legal regulation of interceptions to cover private networks that are attached, directly or indirectly to a public telecommunications system, and includes anything comprising speech, music, sounds, visual images or data of any description. Therefore, a criminal offence is not committed in the UK if the controller of a private network intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission, but section 1(3) provides that interceptions witho ut lawful authority are still actionable under the remit provided for by the HRA 1998 that is discussed below70.On the basis of this understanding of data retention laws discussed in the previous chapter, it is also important to look to consider whether the scheme for identity cards proposed under the ICA 2006 based on personal data retention as a means of identification will serve to profane the recognition of individual human rights and civil liberties. This is because whilst it would clearly be hard to argue using surveillance technology to gain solid evidence for the purposes of preventing serious crime and encouraging counter terrorism is a worst thing, there is an all too prevalent need within the current climate for the striking of a balance between maintaining national security and unnecessarily invading an individuals privacy.In spite of their legitimate aims, the introduction of identity cards in the UK could be considered to be just the latest step in the governments ef forts to encourage crime prevention and counter terrorism at the expense of the individual rights and freedoms. This is because, in the same way as other advancements in surveillance technology, identity cards are also not without their problems. There is a prevailing feeling the use of identity cards across the nation will serve to breach individual human rights and civil liberties in the same way as many other forms of surveillance. In particular, it has been argued the use of identity cards will serve to breach individual rights to privacy because of the nature of the personal data that will be stored and retained within them and on the NIR database71.Therefore, although there is little doubt the use of such technology for information gathering is very advantageous to help the government, the police, and even everyday people, question marks have arisen in relation to just how far surveillance technology should be used to monitor the public. Consequently, there is an argument thos e who use surveillance for the purposes of information gathering should take on certain responsibilities they must then uphold in view of the implementation of the ECHR into the UK via the HRA 1998. But in some ways technological advances have arguably hindered the recognition of human rights and civil liberties as much as they have helped crime prevention and counter terrorism by allowing the authorities an unprecedented look into peoples lives.3.1 The right to personal privacyThe right to personal privacy is an important right, however, it is all too easily taken for granted because, like freedom, no one really appreciates its value until it is threatened, as in this case with the enactment of the ICA72, so that in the wake of technological advancement privacy has all too easily become an afterthought in kindly advancement73. This is a significant failing. The right to privacy should not merely be limited to the idea an individual may live their personal life how they choose. It is also meant to include the right to establish and develop dealingships with other people for the development and fulfilment of ones own personality74, whilst sexual relations are the most intimate aspect of the right to a private life75. However, the right to a private life also covers an individuals physical and moral integrity76, encompassing protection against compulsory physical interventions and treatments77. Moreover, in spite of the